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Using a real-time data set for German GDP over the period from 1973 to 1998 we calculate 
various measures of real-time output gaps and use these to calibrate and estimate Taylor-type 
reaction functions for the Bundesbank. Most of the reaction functions we find fit the 
Bundesbank's actual policy, as represented by the short-run interest rate, quite well. In contrast to 
previous findings based on ex post revised data for the output gap, we find the reaction 
coefficients to resemble quite closely those originally proposed by Taylor for some of our real-
time measures of the output gap. Broad monetary aggregates such as M3, in contrast, only played 
a small role for the Bundesbank's interest rate decisions. Given the good record of the 
Bundesbank in fighting inflation, the results give support to the use of the Taylor rule for 
monetary policy. 
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Taylor rules in diﬀerent shapes and forms have become very popular in describing
monetary policy strategies. Part of their popularity stems from their apparent suc-
cess in duplicating interest rate decisions ex post in a positive sense. Taylor (1993),
in his seminal paper, shows that the monetary policy decisions of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board between 1982 and 1992 can be described well by the simple equation
he proposes. For the period from 1965 to 1980, however, his rule cannot duplicate
the Fed’s historic decisions; the rule recommends a much higher interest rate than
that actually set by the Fed. From this positive observation, Taylor (1999b) reaches
the normative conclusion that the high inﬂation rates, which the United States
experienced in the 1970s, had likely been avoided, had the Fed followed his rule.
Normative implications with respect to monetary policy rules may, however, not
only be drawn from the historical experience of the United States. In Europe, the
Deutsche Bundesbank conducted monetary policy largely independently from the
Fed from 1973 to 1998 — with quite diﬀerent results. Unlike the Fed, the Bun-
d e s b a n kb ya n dl a r g ek e p ti n ﬂation tamed, even in the shock-ridden 1970s and
early 1980s. In fact, in the 1970s and 1980s German inﬂation was lower than in
any other OECD country (Clarida and Gertler 1996). Moreover, with the Bun-
desbank’s formal independence and with its policy to publicly announce explicit
targets for monetary growth (as well as implicit targets for inﬂation, termed the
”unavoidable” or ”normative” inﬂation), some important institutional features of
German monetary policy during the Bundesbank’s “active” period already coin-
cided with the institutional setting many economists today regard as desirable for
controlling inﬂation and which meanwhile have in modiﬁed ways found their ways
into the institutional designs of other central banks such as the Bank of England or
the European Central Bank.
Oﬃcially, the monetary strategy with which the Bundesbank managed to reach
its impressive results, however, was diﬀerent from the kind of ”inﬂation targeting”
described by the rule Taylor (1993) devised for the Fed under Alan Greenspan. The
Bundesbank always emphasised that it pursued monetary targeting, a strategy that
implies changing the interest rate when the growth rate of some broad monetary
aggregate deviates from its target value or range but not necessarily in response
to short-term changes in inﬂation or the output gap. Still, while the Bundesbank
publicly announced growth targets for its preferred monetary aggregate each year
between 1975 and 1998, the role monetary growth actually played for its mone-
tary policy decisions is not clear. Interestingly, while the inﬂation record of the
Bundesbank was remarkable by international standards and its credibility for low
inﬂation was high, they were so despite the fact that the Bundesbank frequently
missed its monetary target, in some cases by a long mark.1 The decisive factor
for the Bundesbank’s credibility may, thus, not have been its rather ”pragmatic”
1The Bundesbank missed 11 out of the 24 targets for monetary growth it announced. In
each case, monetary growth exceeded the target value. Still the Bundesbank never attempted
to overcompensate for overexpansion in one year by setting a lower value for the next year. See
Schächter (1999), Boﬁnger (1994).
1way of monetary targeting but its commitment to low inﬂation, implemented by an
inﬂation targeting strategy that included annual announcements of inﬂation targets
(Boﬁnger 1994). This view is broadly supported by von Hagen (1999) who, after
analysing minutes from the Central Bank Council of the years 1971-8, concludes
with respect to the role of monetary targeting in the Bundesbank’s policy at that
time:
”A two-stage nature of the decisions - which would have implied during the
course of the year that monetary policy considerations focus on achieving the
monetary target - is not evident from the discussions in the Central Bank
Council. Equally, the Council in no way resisted the temptation to direct
individual monetary policy measures to short-term employment-related goals
[...]. The discussions in the Central Bank Council consistently reﬂected eﬀorts
to check out various ’motivational ﬁelds’ for monetary policy to see whether a
change in the current stance was called for. In the period considered here these
ﬁelds regularly included the development of the real economy, international
trends, developments in the money and capital markets and price trend.”
(Von Hagen 1999, p.434f)
From this description of the decision making process at the Bundesbank – at
least in the 1970s – it is diﬃcult to see large diﬀerences to the Fed’s practice
under Greenspan. We, therefore, set out to evaluate whether the Taylor rule is
an appropriate description of monetary policy in Germany between 1973 and 1998.
In light of the record of the Bundesbank in controlling inﬂation, ﬁnding German
short-term interest rates to lie indeed close to those implied by the Taylor rule would
imply that the rule is helpful in achieving low inﬂation.
The relevance of the Taylor rule for the Bundesbank’s policy has been analysed
by a number of studies before (see Clarida and Gertler 1996, Clarida et al. 1998,
Deutsche Bundesbank 1999, Kamps and Pierdzioch 2003). A major drawback of
these studies is that they do not acknowledge the informational problems associated
with monetary policy rules. As argued by Orphanides (1998, 2002), calculating
or estimating the weights in a monetary policy rule on the basis of the ex post
revised data available to the research today can yield misleading descriptions of
historical policy with questionable normative implications. Historical evaluations
of monetary policy rules, in his view, need to be based exclusively on data that was
actually available to the decision makers at the time of the decision. To show what
diﬀerence it makes when diﬀerent ”vintages” of data are used, Orphanides (2002)
recalculates the path of the federal funds target implied by the Taylor rule on the
basis of such real-time data for the 1970s. Quite in opposite to Taylor (1999b), he
ﬁnds the path of the Taylor rate to be very similar to the interest rate path observed
in reality. Given these ﬁndings we base our assessment of the Bundesbank’s policy
on a real-time data set that we constructed for that purpose.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the construction
of our real-time data for GDP and potential output and points out the diﬀerences
between real-time and ex post revised data for Germany. Section 3 then presents
our estimates of dynamic Taylor rules, and the last section draws some conclusions.
22C o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e D a t a S e t
In assessing whether a Taylor-type rule can adequately describe the Bundesbank’s
interest rate decisions, it is important to rely exclusively on data that was avail-
able to Bundesbank oﬃcials at the time of their decisions. Accordingly, the use
of historical data currently available from the German statistical oﬃce is ruled out
for all series that undergo substantial revisions. In particular, we cannot use the
currently available “vintage” of historical real GDP data. Moreover, we cannot rely
on ex post estimates for potential output, both because GDP data has been revised
and because the full sample estimate of the medium-term trend in GDP, regardless
of the concrete estimation procedure, is likely to be diﬀerent from the trend esti-
mated using the conﬁned data set available at the historical time of decision. Put
diﬀerently, the outlook for medium-term growth of the German economy in, say,
early 1973 (before the ﬁrst oil price shock) most likely looked very diﬀerent from
what the growth rate looks like from today’s perspective. For the data on inﬂa-
tion, in contrast, the diﬀerence between revised and real-time is much less relevant
since revisions are of minor magnitude and there is no need for trend estimates. In
f a c t ,i nw h a tf o l l o w s ,w et r e a tt h ei n ﬂation rate and, of course, the interest rate as
unrevised variables and thus use the last available vintage in the calculations and
estimations of policy reaction functions. The construction of the real-time set is
conﬁned to real GDP and potential output.
2.1 Real GDP/GNP
Our real-time data for GDP contains seasonally adjusted quarterly data of the
vintages 1973Q1 to 1998Q4, collected from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly
publication “Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaftszahlen”. In total there are 104 time series
on real GDP/GNP in our database, one for each vintage. Each series reaches
back to 1962Q1 but ends in a diﬀerent period (the ﬁrst vintage, for example, ends
1972Q4). Consequently, the longest series, which is that of the vintage 1998Q4, has
147 observations (1962Q1 to 1998Q3). The data set can be thought of as a 147 x 104
matrix, each entry of which represents a real-time data point. Each column vector
of the matrix represents a new vintage of data, representing the data available for
policy-makers at that vintage date. For example, the ﬁrst column contains the data
on real GNP available to the Bundesbank in the ﬁrst quarter of 1973. It starts in
1962Q1 and ends in 1972Q4, as the data is only available with a lag of one (and a
half) quarter.
Since the series published in “Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaftszahlen” underwent
some changes, we needed to make some assumptions when constructing the data set.
First, each issue of “Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaftszahlen” only contains quarterly
data for the last ten years. To let each series reach back to 1962Q1, we appended
data from the most current available longer vintage. We believe that this ﬂaw
of our data set is negligible with respect to the analysis of policy rules. For the
estimation of potential output or dynamic monetary reaction patterns, for which
historical data of the respective vintage is, of course, important, the eﬀect of a
3possible diﬀerence between the actual real-time data, that we do not have and the
near real-time series we have in our data set is likely to be extremely small. Second,
until the early 1990s the data in our source refers to real seasonally and trading
day adjusted GNP, after that it refers to the respective GDP ﬁgure. We treat the
data from the two deﬁn i t i o n sa st h es a m es e r i e s ,a st h ed i ﬀerences between GNP
and GDP are generally small in Germany. Third, between 1975Q2 and 1991Q1
the published series was not trading day-adjusted. However, trading day-adjusted
growth rates were given in addition, albeit rounded to half or full percentage points.
We undertook our own trading-day adjustment2 and compared the growth rates of
the adjusted series with the published but rounded growth rates, ﬁnding only small
diﬀerences; in the following we use the self-adjusted data. Finally, the data up to
1995Q1 refers to West Germany only. Beginning with the vintage of 1995Q2, we
use data for uniﬁed Germany. To avoid a jump due to reuniﬁcation, within the
vintages from 1995Q2 onwards we link the data for West Germany with that of the
reuniﬁed country by using West Germany’s growth rates from 1993Q4 backwards
(see for a similar approach SVR 2001, Zf. 459).
The diﬀerence between our real-time data for GNP/GDP and the ex post re-
vised data can be seen from Figure 1. The ﬁgure depicts the growth rate of real
GNP/GDP against the respective quarter in the previous year in percent, both for
the ex post revised data and for our real-time data. The two series are generally
quite close, so the magnitude of the revisions is not very large. Striking diﬀer-
ences between the series occur only in two periods, 1975Q1 and 1991Q1. These two
exceptions apart, data revisions do not seem to play much of a role for German
GNP/GDP data.
2.2 Potential Output
The Taylor rule does not incorporate information on real GNP/GDP directly, but
on its deviation from potential output, the output gap. Real-time estimates of the
output gap may deviate from ex post estimates for two reasons. First, because of the
use of unrevised data. Second, because the information set used today to estimate
potential output for a historical data point is bigger than the one available at that
time. Virtually all estimation methods for potential output rely on measures that
separate the non-cyclical from the cyclical component of some economic variable.
Applied in real time, where the future of the series is still unknown, these methods
suﬀer from an end-of-sample problem, which makes the separation of trend and cycle
at the end of the series much less reliable than it is ex post, where the complete
series is known to the researcher. Therefore, one would expect real-time output gap
estimates to be subject to revisions even if the underlying data were not revised
at all. Table 1 illustrates the diﬀerences between real-time output gaps and ex
post output gaps. Series at denotes the real-time output gap series, calculated on
2We obtained ”quasi-Bundesbank” trading-day adjustment factors for 1975-91 by regressing
the annual change of the trading-day adjustment factors the Bundesbank currently publishes for
real GDP from 1992Q1 to 2002Q2 on the annual change of the number of working days. We then
”backcasted” these factors on the basis of the estimated coeﬃcients and the number of working
days in 1975Q2-1991Q1.
4the basis of real-time GNP/GDP and real-time estimates of potential output. The
series ct, in contrast, is the ex post output gap series calculated on the basis of
ex post revised GDP ﬁgures and estimates of potential output estimated using all
information available today. Finally, the series bt corresponds to a ”quasi-real-time”
(Orphanides and van Norden, 2002) output gap series, a measure in-between the
former two. It is based on ex post revised real GDP ﬁgures, but the estimates for
potential output are obtained recursively, that is, by exclusively using information
(on ex post revised real GDP) up to the respective real-time data point.
The Bundesbank estimated potential output in Germany using a production
function approach. Unfortunately, consistent real-time data on the Bundesbank’s
estimates of the level of potential output are not available.3 To obtain real-time
estimates of potential output, we use univariate time series-based measures. The
advantage of these rather simple measures is that they require no other information
than past (and possibly future) values of real GDP.4 Following Orphanides and van
Norden (2002), we employ a linear trend, a quadratic trend and the ﬁlter proposed
by Hodrick and Prescott (1997). Both for the linear and the quadratic trend, we
estimate two versions. In the ﬁrst version, the trend is estimated on a sample that
is ﬁxed to start in 1962, whereas in the second version, the trend regressions are
estimated using rolling samples with ten years of data. The second version serves to
account for changes in the trend that are likely to have occurred since the 1960s.5
To solve the end-of-sample problem of the Hodrick—Prescott ﬁlter, we follow Baxter
and King (1995) and base the calculation of the ﬁlter at the end of the sample on
data including forecasts over the next 12 quarters. The forecasts are generated from
an AR(8) model for the change in real GNP/GDP that is estimated recursively with
the real-time data available.
To compute real-time output gaps, we estimate potential output for each data
vintage using exclusively the information available at that point in time and subtract
its logarithm from the logarithm of the respective real-time GNP/GDP ﬁgure. For
example, in 1979Q1 we subtract the (log of the) estimate for potential output in
1978Q4 from actual output in 1978Q4, being the (log of the) latest realization of
output available at that time. Repeating this process for all of our 104 series of real
GNP/GDP and recording the most recently estimated output gap, we get a real-
time output gap series consisting of output gaps computed only with data available
in each time period.
As regards the estimated ex post output gaps, we ﬁnd some diﬀerences between
the individual procedures, especially for a period in the middle of the 1980s and
in the early 1990s (Figure 2). Still, even the diﬀerences for the mid 1980s are
small compared to the diﬀerences produced by the ﬁve real-time measures of the
3The Bundesbank published an estimate of the expected growth rate of potential output at the
beginning of each year when presenting its target range for monetary growth. However, it did not
give an estimate of the level of potential output or on capacity utilisation. Estimates of the level
of potential output based on a production function approach were published in three articles in
the Bundesbank’s monthly bulletin, see Deutsche Bundesbank (1973, 1981, 1995).
4We do not consider more sophisticated multivariate measures here because Orphanides and
van Norden (2002) found them not to be superior to univariate measures for U.S. data.
5A similar approach has been applied to U.S. data by Ghysels et al. (2002).
5output gap (Figure 3). These diﬀerences occur both between the individual real-
time output gaps series and between the real-time and the ex post series (solid
lines). The diﬀerences between the individual real-time output gap estimates are
particularly pronounced for the recession of 1974/75 and for the uniﬁcation boom in
the early 1990s, two periods where there were also large revisions in the underlying
data for real GDP. For 1990, as an example, the real-time output gap based on a
ﬁxed-sample linear trend is close to zero while its counterparts based on a rolling-
sample linear trend and on a ﬁxed-sample quadratic trend are 6 percent and 8
percent, respectively.
The methods used for estimating potential output not only diﬀer in their as-
sessment of the current state of the business cycle as given by the output gap, but
also in the magnitude of the revisions of their output gap estimates. The latter are
measured by the deviation of the real-time output gaps from the ex post output
gaps. Some summary statistics on the revisions of the output gap estimates are
given in Table 2. The ﬁrst column shows the mean of the revisions. Note that
apart from the ﬁxed sample quadratic trend all measures tend to underestimate the
magnitude of a positive output gap and overestimate the magnitude of a negative
gap in real time. The mean revision is highest for the linear detrending based on
a ﬁxed sample. The magnitude of this bias, which is responsible for the high root
mean squared error (RMSE) of 5.99 and which is also evident from the upper part of
Figure 3, casts some doubt on the fact that such a measure has in fact been used in
real-time. The same conclusion holds for the rolling sample quadratic trend, which
has a lower RMSE than the ﬁxed sample linear trend but seems to be virtually
uncorrelated with the ﬁnal estimate of the output gap from this procedure. Judged
from the correlation and the RMSE, rolling sample linear detrending seems to be
the most consistent output gap estimator, followed by HP ﬁltering and, with some
distance, by the ﬁxed sample quadratic detrending. Contrasting the real-time out-
put gap series with this quasi-real output gap series in Figure 4, we largely conﬁrm
the ﬁndings of Orphanides and van Norden (2002) for the U.S. case.6 The data
revisions only explain a rather small fraction of the diﬀerences between real-time
and ex post output gap estimates. The end-of-sample characteristics involved with
the methods to estimate potential output constitute the major problem.
As a ﬁnal check of our time series-based real-time measures of the output gap,
we compare them to the real-time estimates from a completely diﬀerent but inﬂu-
ential source Since the early 1960s, the Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (SVR, German Council of Economic Experts)
in its annual reports has been publishing estimates of the growth rate of potential
output, of the aggregate rate of capacity utilization as well as of the deviation of
the aggregate rate of capacity utilization from its long-run average.7 The latter
ﬁgure is the one we use for comparison here, since in contrast to our time series-
6We also provide justiﬁcation for Rünstler (2002), who estimates what he calls ”real-time”
output gaps for the euro area, which are in fact quasi-real output gaps.
7According to the SVR reports, the SVR’s real-time estimate of the long-run average or ”nor-
mal” aggregate capacity utilization was 97.5 percent between 1971 and 1985, 96.5 between 1986
and 1994 and 96.75 from 1995 to 1998.
6based measures which deﬁne potential output as the average or trend output over
some period, in the concept of the SVR potential output is deﬁned as the output
maximal attainable at full utilization of the capital stock: The SVR estimated po-
tential output by multiplying the average annual capital stock by an estimate of
potential capital productivity which, in turn, was obtained by extrapolating capital
productivity observed at the last cyclical peak by the average growth rate of capital
productivity over a complete productivity cycle (see e. g. SVR 1974).
The SVR’s estimates were published in November and referred to the average
for the respective calendar year They included a forecast for GDP growth in the
fourth quarter of the year. For comparison, we calculated real-time calendar year
averages for each of our ﬁve time series-based measures by taking the average over
the four output gaps of a calendar year as they had been observed in the ﬁrst
quarter of the following year. While strictly speaking this sets the SVR estimates
at a slight informational disadvantage and makes the measures incomparable, this
way we avoid having to produce forecasts for fourth quarter GDP.
The SVR’s annual real-time estimates of the deviation of the aggregate rate
of capacity utilization from its long-run average – taken from the reports of the
respective years – are shown as solid lines in Figure 5 alongside the annual averages
for our ﬁve time series-based measures. As is evident from the graph, the time series-
based measures that seemed to be the most consistent in the analysis above also
come closes to the SVR’s measure. The output gap measure based on moving-
window linear detrending tracks the SVR’s measure quite closely. Calculating some
of the deviation statistics used in Table 2, we ﬁnd that the latter measure has
the lowest deviation from the SVR’s measure (as quantiﬁed by the RMSE) and
also the highest correlation with the SVR gap. The measure based on Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁltering comes second in terms of the RMSE but has a lower correlation
than the measure based on ﬁxed sample quadratic detrending. Fixed sample linear
and moving sample quadratic detrending, again, are far oﬀ.
Overall, we conclude that the choice of the detrending procedure plays a substan-
tial role for estimating output gaps in Germany, especially when real-time series are
used. Given this result, we expect a signiﬁcant impact of the detrending procedure
on coeﬃcient estimates of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy rule.
3 Taylor Rules for the Bundesbank
Given our real-time output gap series, we are now in the position to investigate
whether the Bundesbank’s monetary policy over the period of 1973 to 1998 can be
characterized as following a Taylor rule. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether the German
three-month money market rate (Frankfurt Interbank Oﬀer Rate, FIBOR) can be
described as a linear combination of the deviation of the inﬂation rate from the
Bundesbank’s implicit target rate and the (real-time) output gap and, if so, which
weights of these two factors ﬁt the Bundesbank’s policy best.
73.1 Calibration
As a ﬁrst point in our analysis, we use the various output gap series described above
to calibrate simple backward-looking Taylor rules of the form
rt = rr − (β − 1)π∗
t + βπt + γ(yt−1|t − y∗
t−1|t) (1)
where rt is the short-term interest rate targeted by the central bank, rr is the
equilibrium real interest rate, πt is the current inﬂation rate, β and γ are weights, π∗
t
the time-varying normative inﬂation rate of the Bundesbank and yt−1|t−y∗
t−1|t is the
output gap in t−1 as observed at time t. All variables are measured in percent. As
inﬂation rate we choose the change in the consumer price index.8 The Bundesbank’s
implicit target inﬂation rates π∗
t are the ”unavoidable” or ”normative” rates of
inﬂation the Bundesbank presented in its annual announcements of the target range
for monetary growth.9 For the equilibrium real interest rate rr we assume a value
of 2 percent since this is close to the average rate of GDP growth in Germany
over the sample period. Note that in (1) we allow the inﬂation diﬀerential to
aﬀect the interest rate contemporaneously whereas the output gap aﬀects interest
rate decisions with a lag of one quarter. The reason is that data on inﬂation was
usually available at the end of the reported month. GDP data, in contrast, was
only available one quarter after the end of the reported quarter. While this may
seem to advocate a lag of two quarters for the output gap, this would probably
underestimate the information available to Bundesbank decision makers as monthly
indicators on industrial production and some other activities as well as survey based
indicators such as ifo Institute’s business climate allowed them to roughly estimate
last quarter’s GDP some weeks before the oﬃcial data were actually published.
Figure 6 shows the three-month FIBOR in comparison to the calibrated rates
based on three real-time measures of potential output, the moving window linear
trend, the ﬁxed window quadratic trend and the trend based on a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter with autoregressive forecast. In each case, the standard weights proposed by
Taylor (1993, 1999) of 1.5 for β and 0.5 for γ have been chosen. Evidently, all three
calibrated rates track the FIBOR more or less closely, except for the spikes in 1973
and 1981 and the year 1987, after the fall in energy prices. Overall, the calibration
exercise seems to support the proposition that a Taylor rule can duplicate the
Bundesbank’s policy quite well. However, the short-run variation of the calibrated
rule is generally higher than that of the FIBOR, indicating interest smoothing on
t h es i d eo ft h eB u n d e s b a n k .
3.2 Dynamic Estimates of the Bundesbank’s Rule
We now go one step further and estimate the parameters of a Taylor-type rule for the
Bundesbank. Again, diﬀerent measures of real-time output gaps are used in order to
8Using the GNP/GDP deﬂator gave a similar ﬁt of the calibrated Taylor rule except for the
period 1985 to 1987 when falling energy prices caused the two indicators to move in opposite
directions.
9The Bundesbank’s annual implicit inﬂation targets were taken from table II.3 in Schächter
(1999) and interpolated to obtain a quarterly series.
8judge the robustness of the estimates. Previous research, based on ex post revised
data, has found the Taylor rule to be a good approximation for German short-run
interest rates, with coeﬃcient estimates lying somewhat below those proposed by
Taylor (1993). For instance, Clarida et al. (1998) ﬁnd a value of 1.31 for β and 0.25
for γ, Faust et al. (2001) report values of 1.31 and 0.18, respectively and Kamps
and Pierdzioch (2003) of estimate values of 1.18 and 0.18, respectively.10 These
estimates, however, refer to a speciﬁcation were equation (1) is augmented by a
one-period lagged short-run interest rate to account for interest rate inertia. More
importantly, πt is usually replaced by Et(πt+4), its expected value one year from
now, to account for forward-looking decisions, implying that the Bundesbank was
looking at inﬂation one year ahead when setting the interest rate. Because of the
expectational variable appearing on the right-hand side of the regression, estimation
is to be carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).
While central banks usually act forward-looking because of the lags in the trans-
mission of monetary policy impulses to inﬂation, the forward-looking interest rate
rules estimated in the literature are not without problems. The inclusion of an
expectational regressors at some lead, as for instance Et(πt+4), brings about au-
tocorrelated residuals which in the usual dynamic equations with a lagged interest
rate as a regressor may well cause biased estimates. In addition, this autocorrela-
tion makes the correct speciﬁcation of the dynamics of the estimated diﬃcult. All
of the existing studies assume very simple dynamics by introducing only one lagged
short-term interest rate term. Residual autocorrelation beyond the order that is
introduced by the leading regressors Et(πt+4) is not tested, although it may give
an indication whether a more complicated dynamic speciﬁcation is needed. The
fact that higher order lags of the interest rate as well as of the output gap and
the inﬂation rate from further in the past may also have directly aﬀected the cen-
tral bank’s decisions is precluded by these speciﬁcations. Again, misspeciﬁcation
of these dynamic eﬀects may well lead to autocorrelated residuals with the conse-
quence of biased estimates of the coeﬃcient standard errors and – since a lagged
endogenous variable is among the regressors – even the coeﬃcients themselves.
In addition, recent theoretical research has raised doubt on the way ”forecasts”
are generally accounted for in forward-looking Taylor rules. Woodford and Giannoni
(2002) ﬁnd that optimal rules may in the case of inﬂation inertia be forecast-based,
but that the forecasts enter the rule in a more complicated way than usually as-
sumed.11 Moreover, in their model, it is the forecast for the current and the next
quarter that matters most, forecasts for later periods are barely relevant. Over-
all, the authors conclude that forecasts play a relatively small role in the optimal
monetary policy rule.
10For the Fed from the 1980s on, Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) compute values in the range of 1.79
to 2.15 for β a n di nt h er a n g eo f0 . 0 7t o0 . 9 3f o rγ whereas Orphanides (2001) calculates values
in the range of 1.80 to 1.95 for β and 0.17 to 0.27 for γ.F o raﬁctitious euro area central bank,
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2003) ﬁnd a coeﬃcient for the inﬂation gap in the range of 1.9 to 2.2, for
the output gap of 0.1 to 0.5.
11For instance, a higher inﬂation forecast may at times result in a lower current interest rate, in
order to cause higher current inﬂation to avoid sudden changes in inﬂation which in their model
cause the greatest welfare losses. See Woodford and Giannoni (2002, 30f.).
9To avoid the potential pitfalls in the estimation of forward-looking rules, we will
in the following estimate dynamic non-forward-looking rules for the Bundesbank.
Still, our estimates do not preclude that the Bundesbank acted forward-looking. In
fact, the estimated functions can be interpreted as reduced forms of forward-looking
rules. While we cannot attach a structural interpretation to each of the coeﬃcients,
in the sense that we can, for instance, determine whether the lagged output gap
is signiﬁcant because the Bundesbank attempted to stabilize the business cycle or
simply because it served to forecast future inﬂation, the coeﬃcients nevertheless
show the overall importance of contemporaneous and lagged inﬂation and lagged
output gap data for the Bundesbank’s decisions.
To allow for a more complicated dynamics in the interest setting process, we
introduce further lags of the diﬀerence between actual and target inﬂation and of
the output gap in our empirical equation. As shown by Aoki (2003), lags of the
order p of the interest rate, the inﬂation rate and the output gap enter a reduced
form policy rule when the random shocks to inﬂation and output follow AR(p)
processes. Without restricting the lag order p to be the same across all variables a
priori our dynamic Taylor rule reads












Note that as above, we allow inﬂation to aﬀect the interest rate contemporaneously
while the output gap enters with a lag of one quarter. Notice further that the second
sub index at the lags of the real-time output gap yt−i|t − y∗
t−i|t is ﬁxed at date t.
This way we ensure that the lags of this variable always refer to the most recent
vintage of output gap data.
Unfortunately, coeﬃcient estimates from this dynamic Taylor rule are not easily
compared directly to the Taylor rules proposed in the literature, which are usually
static or contain only a single lag of the interest rate to account for interest rate
smoothing. Comparability is, however, easily established by re-parameterizing (2)
as an error-correction model, that is12
∆rt = θ0 + θ1rt−1 + θ2π∗













where ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator (∆xt = xt − xt−1) and the long-run para-
m e t e r so ft h es t a t i cr u l e( 1 )a r ee a s i l yr e c o v e r e da srr = θ0
θ1, β
∗ = θ2
θ1 = −(β − 1),
β = θ3
θ1 and γ = θ4
θ1. As an alternative to calculating the long-run coeﬃcients
from the estimated coeﬃcients of the error-correction equation, the long-run co-
eﬃcients can be estimated directly together with their standard errors using the
so-called Bewley-transform of the error-correction equation (Wickens and Breusch
1988). This method will be employed below.
12For a similar error-correction approach applied to U.S. data, see Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
10A particular role is played by the coeﬃcient θ1 in this error-correction framework.
First, it can be interpreted as ρ − 1,w h e r eρ i st h es u mo ft h ec o e ﬃcients on the
lagged interest rate. As such it is directly comparable to the lagged interest rate
coeﬃcients estimated from more restrictive approaches in the literature. Second, in
case the variables in the equation are integrated, the standard t-statistic of θ1 can
be used to test the hypothesis that the two series are not cointegrated (see Kremers
et al. 1992). However, testing for non-stationarity using the DF-GLS test of Elliott
et al. (1996) with a constant term and ﬁve autoregressive lags included, we were
able to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for the short-run interest rate
at the 1% level and for the inﬂation rate at the 5% level of signiﬁcance. We could
also reject non-stationarity for all of the real-time output gap measures at least on
the 10% level; the ex post measures are stationary by construction. Thus, testing
for cointegration is not relevant in the present context.
For the estimation, the maximum lag order of the error-correction model is cho-
sen to be 4 (p1 −1=p2 − 1=p3 − 1=5 ) , since that lag order should be suﬃcient
to remove any residual autocorrelation due to seasonality. Tests for autocorre-
lation applied to each equation supported this view, implying that all estimated
equations are free of autocorrelation. To reach a parsimonious speciﬁcation and
consequently low coeﬃcient standard errors, ﬁrst-diﬀerenced variables with a mar-
ginal signiﬁcance level of their t-statistic of below 7.5 percent were restricted to zero,
implying that the actual lag order of a particular equation may well be lower than
5. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used for calculating t-statistics.
The OLS long-run estimates for our eight measures of the output gap are pre-
sented in Table 3 together with the ¯ R2, which measures how much of the variance of
the change in the three-month-market rate is explained by the regression13 and the
results of the ExpF test for a structural break at an unknown break point proposed
by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). The test procedure is to generate LM statistics
of the hypothesis of no structural break for each data point in the sample, except
from a trimming region of 15 percent at the start and the end, and to use either the
minimum or an exponentially weighted average of these LM statistics as the ﬁnal
statistic. P-values for the non-standard distribution of this test (given in squared
brackets) were obtained using the method proposed by Hansen (1997). The test re-
jects the null hypothesis of no structural break at a 10% percent level of signiﬁcance
for the ﬁxed sample linear and the rolling sample quadratic detrending procedures.
For the remaining models, the test does not indicate any parameter instability.
For each of the three detrending procedures, the ﬁrst line gives the results for the
ex post revised data. Note that the coeﬃcient estimates are very close for these data
across the detrending procedures. A researcher working with ex post revised data
would, thus, have concluded that the choice of the detrending procedure does not
matter much for estimating the Bundesbank’s reaction function. In addition, the
researcher would have concluded that the Bundesbank did not look at the output
gap when taking its decisions, not even when forecasting inﬂation, since, regardless
of the detrending procedure, the estimated coeﬃcients of the output gap γ are not
13The ¯ R2 refers to the error-correction parametrisation (3), not to the Bewley-transform since
the latter is estimated by instrumental variables.
11signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus, while the researcher had found the coeﬃcient
estimates of the inﬂation rate β to be close to the value of 1.5 suggested by Taylor
(1993) – implying that the Bundesbank controlled real short-term interest rates
by varying nominal interest rates by more than the change in inﬂation –, she
had rejected the Taylor rule as a description of the decision making process at the
Bundesbank for the insigniﬁcant output gap coeﬃcient.
With real-time data for the output gap, the evidence is more favorable for the
Taylor rule. While the estimates of all coeﬃcients vary more widely across the de-
trending procedures compared to the ex post revised output gap data, the estimates
of the inﬂation coeﬃcient associated with the diﬀerent procedures are still close to
1.5. In contrast to the ex post data based estimates, however, depending on the
detrending procedure, there are now also some statistically signiﬁcant output gap
coeﬃcients. The three models with the highest explanatory power as gauged by
their ¯ R2 all have estimates for γ that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The best-
ﬁtting model, the one based on rolling-sample linear detrending, and likewise the
model based on ﬁxed-sample quadratic detrending even give coeﬃcient estimates
close to Taylor’s suggestion of 0.5. For the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter-based output
gap, however, the estimate is substantially higher, reﬂecting the fact that real-time
output gaps based on this detrending procedure are less volatile than those based on
other two procedures (see Figure 3). This divergence of the estimated coeﬃcients
highlights their dependence on the detrending method which only becomes appar-
ent when real time data are used in the analysis since pronounced diﬀerences in the
volatility of the output gap estimates only appear with real-time data, the volatil-
ity of the ex post revised output gaps is relatively similar across the detrending
methods.
The parameter estimates, moreover, indicate substantial inertia in Bundesbank
interest rate setting, as can be seen from the signiﬁcant estimates for the adjustment
coeﬃcient ρ − 1. By and large in line with previous studies, we ﬁnd an estimate
for ρ – which measures the sum of all lagged interest rate coeﬃcients – of about
0.8, implying that only 20 percent of the current level of the interest rate was
inﬂuenced by the most recent developments concerning inﬂation and output, the
rest was determined before. In contrast to previous studies, however, the dynamic
speciﬁcation often involved more than one lag of the interest rate. This ﬁnding of a
strong backward-looking element in the Bundesbank’s implicit decision is interesting
since recent research on optimal interest rate rules has shown that optimal rules also
have such a backward-looking character. Woodford (1999, 2000) argues that when
private agents with rational expectations act forward-looking and the decisions of
these private agents determine the economy’s future path, optimal monetary policy
cannot act purely forward-looking, that is, it cannot act only upon those aspects of
the state of the economy that are relevant for forecasting the inﬂation. Instead, it
must also act in response to past shocks and change the interest rate in the way that
brings about the development of the economy it wishes the private sector to expect
in order to fulﬁl its commitments and retain the credibility that ultimately makes
its policy more eﬀective. The optimal interest rate rules calculated by Woodford
and Giannoni (2002) often involve more than one lag of the interest rate.
12Somewhat astonishing is the estimate for β
∗ which should be equal to −(β −1)
but is substantially higher for all detrending procedures. However, this result dis-
appears when ”outliers” are controlled for. We ﬁnd three poorly modelled obser-
vations, as indicated by a studentized residual with a t-value of more than 3.0,
which we model by a 0/1 dummy. Two of the dummies ”model” the episode in the
ﬁrst half of 1981 where the Bundesbank partly followed the interest rate hike in
the United States during the Volcker disinﬂation. The other dummy captures the
extraordinary sharp fall in German interest rates in early 1975. We re-estimate the
error-correction model for the output gap based on linear detrending including these
dummies, impose the restriction β
∗+β =1and get (long-run parameters and their
absolute, heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics obtained from the Bewley-transform
shown in squared brackets):
∆rt =0 .82 − 0.23
h
rt−1 − 0.32π∗
t +1 .32πt +0 .70(yt−1|t − y∗
t−1|t)
i
(5.94) (7.49) (2.23) (9.23) (8.91)
+0.24∆rt−1 − 0.11∆rt−3 − 1.96D75Q1+1 .98D81Q1+1 .79D81Q2
(3.39) (1.41) (4)
Again, non-cointegration is rejected and the long-run coeﬃcient estimates are
highly signiﬁcant and close to the original Taylor rule. An F-test of the restriction
β
∗ + β =1yields a marginal signiﬁcance level of 0.06. Interest rate inertia are
substantial with changes of the lagged interest rate signiﬁcant with a lag of one
and three quarters. Stability of the long-run parameters over the sample is largely
conﬁrmed by (forward and backward) recursive estimation (ﬁgure 7); apart from
some instability in 1994 shown in the backward recursion, the parameters do not
deviate much from the full-sample estimates.
Overall, our analysis supports the view that the Bundesbank by and large fol-
lowed a Taylor rule. In case some form of ﬂexible linear detrending is employed to
estimate the output gap, the coeﬃcients on the inﬂation gap and the output gap are
even quite close to the values originally proposed by Taylor (1993) for the United
States. In all cases we ﬁnd a substantial interest rate smoothing component.
3.3 The Role of Money
Minford et al. (2002) have recently argued that ﬁnding the output gap and the in-
ﬂation gap signiﬁcant in an interest rate regression such as ours need not necessarily
imply that the central bank followed a Taylor rule. The authors show that a Taylor-
type reaction function could also arise if the central bank followed quite diﬀerent
monetary policy rules such as monetary targeting.14 In this case, the empirically
estimated Taylor-type reaction function is a reduced form of the actual monetary
policy rule, with the money supply hidden in the residual. Since the Bundesbank
has always emphasised monetary targeting as its monetary policy strategy, we ana-
lyze in the following whether there is an additional role for money in our estimated
14See also Taylor (1999) on the relation between his rule and monetary targeting.
13Bundesbank reaction function. Speciﬁcally, we will test whether deviations of the
Bundesbank’s preferred monetary aggregate from its announced target value led to
changes in the 3-month money market rate over and above those implied by the
Taylor rule.
As our measure of the deviation of the money stock from its target, we take the
diﬀerence between the annualised quarter-to-quarter change of the target monetary
aggregate c Mt to the annual rate of change of the money stock announced for (the
fourth quarter of) that year c M∗
t . Unfortunately, in this part of the study we have
to rely on ex-post revised data as we neither have real-time data on the central
bank money stock, the monetary aggregate the Bundesbank targeted between 1975
and 1987 nor on M3, the aggregate the Bundesbank’s announced annual targets or
corridors for between 1988 and 1998.15 The targets or corridors usually referred to
the rate of monetary growth in the fourth quarter of the respective year as compared
to the fourth quarter of the year before. To obtain a time series of point targets, we
convert corridors into point targets by taking the average between the upper and
lower bound of the corridor as the target rate. From this we construct the deviations
(c M− c M∗)t the lags of which we use as an additional regressor in equation (4). After
some experimentation we ﬁnd (again imposing the restriction β
∗ + β =1on the
long-run estimates)16
∆rt =0 .84 − 0.21[rt−1 − 0.23π∗
t +1 .23πt +0 .72(yt−1|t − y∗
t−1|t)
(4.04) (6.68) (1.42) (7.51) (9.75)




+1.39D79Q2+1.20D79Q4+1 .98D81Q1+1 .79D81Q2 . (5)
Apart from the new regressors (c M − c M∗)t−3 and (c M − c M∗)t−4, the reaction
function has not changed much. The long-run coeﬃcient of the output gap is nearly
the same as in (4), the long-run coeﬃcient of the inﬂation rate is slightly smaller,
and the coeﬃcient of the target inﬂation rate is now only marginally signiﬁcant. The
long-run coeﬃcients for the money stock deviations are statistically signiﬁcant with
correct signs, so on average there was an impact of money on the Bundesbank’s
interest rate decisions. Note however, that in economic terms this impact was
small. Adding the coeﬃcients of (c M − c M∗)t−3 and (c M − c M∗)t−4 gives a value
of only 0.11, implying that when M3 exceeded its announced target value by one
percentage point, the Bundesbank on average increased interest rates only by 0.11
percentage points.
15See Baltensberger (1999) for a detailed review of the Bundesbank’s policy in the 1980s and
1990s.
16Since the Bundesbank introduced monetary targeting in 1975 and we employ up to 4 lags of
the monetary deviation measure, the sample starts now starts in 1975Q4. We omit the observation
for 1991Q1 for which no growth rate of M3 can be calculated due to the change in the statistic
f r o mw e s t e r nG e r m a nt op a n - G e r m a nd a t a .
14We, therefore, conclude that while monetary aggregates also played a role in the
Bundesbank’s interest rate decisions, the main impulses came from variables that
ﬁgure in the Taylor rule. This conclusion seems to be in line with the evidence
from the Bundesbank minutes presented above. One caveat to our conclusion is
that it relies on ex post revised data for the money stock, not on the monetary data
Bundesbank oﬃcials had actually at hand when taking their decisions.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has taken a fresh look at the evidence concerning the underpinnings
of the monetary strategy of the Deutsche Bundesbank, a central bank with the
best inﬂation record in the post-Bretton Woods period and an institution often
regarded as a model for the European Central Bank. We investigated whether
the Bundesbank’s interest rate decisions during the period of 1973 to 1998 can be
approximated by a simple interest rate rule of the type proposed by Taylor (1993).
In contrast to previous studies, we took the informational requirements of the rule
explicitly into account and based our analysis on real-time data. This distinction is
important since there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between output gaps estimated ex
post and in real-time that, in turn, aﬀects the size of the output gap coeﬃcient in
our estimated monetary reaction functions.
Monetary reaction functions employing real-time output gaps generated by a
number of diﬀerent detrending methods indicate that a Taylor-type rule can track
the Bundesbank’s actual policy quite well. Movements in German short-run interest
rates are thus broadly consistent with a policy aiming at keeping inﬂation close to
the Bundesbank’s announced target, possibly also at retaining a stable level of
output around its trend. Taylor rules calibrated and estimated on the basis of the
calculated real-time output gaps have an acceptable ﬁt and for some detrending
methods the estimated coeﬃcients show an astonishing analogy to the coeﬃcients
proposed in the original publication of Taylor (1993), except for a signiﬁcant interest
smoothing component. Monetary aggregates, in contrast, only played a minor role
for interest rate decisions. Thus, while one has to keep in mind that the correlation
between the actual short-term interest rates and those suggested by the Taylor rule
does not necessarily imply that the Bundesbank had this form of policy rule in mind
when setting interest rates, in eﬀect it acted as if it did so.
A number of simulation studies17 have recently shown that an interest rate rule
with a parameterisation close to Taylor’s original proposal, usually including some
interest rate smoothing component, has a number of superior properties. Our em-
pirical results for Germany point into the same direction. Part of the success of the
Bundesbank in ﬁghting inﬂation during the 1970s to 1990s seems to be attributable
t ot h ef a c tt h a ti tr e a c t e di naw a yt os h o c k st oi n ﬂation and GDP that was quite
similar to a Taylor rule augmented by interest rate inertia. Overall our results, thus,
strengthen the evidence in favor of a modiﬁed Taylor rule for practical monetary
policy.
17See the papers in Taylor (1999a).
15In addition, our estimates shed new light on the discussion whether the poorer
performance of the German economy relative to the United States in terms of out-
put growth and employment over the last decades can be attributed to a tighter
monetary policy in Germany. Our estimates reveal that the Bundesbank over the
period 1973 to 1998 acted more or less in the same manner as the Fed did under
Alan Greenspan. Despite German historic experiences with two hyperinﬂations, the
”anti-inﬂation bias” of the Bundesbank does not seem to have been stronger than
that of the Fed. There is, thus, no indication, that German monetary policy has
been systematically more restrictive than its U.S. counterpart.
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20Table 2: Summary Statistics on Output Gap Revisons
Mean St. Dev. RMSE St. Dev. Corr
of Revison of Revision of Revision Ex Post Gap
Linear Trend
ﬁxed sample -5.29 2.83 5.99 2.26 33.12
rolling sample -1.01 2.20 2.41 ” 68.34
Quadratic Trend
ﬁxed sample 1.47 4.46 4.67 3.30 12.27
rolling sample -0.17 4.35 4.33 ” -4.12
Hodrick Prescott
Filter -0.09 1.67 1.66 1.58 20.86
All ﬁgures are given in percent. Revisions are the diﬀerences between the real-
time and the ex post output gaps. RMSE is the mean squared error of the revision.
Corr is the correlation of the real-time series with the ex post series.
21Table 3: Long-Run Coeﬃcients of Dynamic Bundesbank Rules 1974Q2-1998Q4
β
∗ βγ ρ − 1 ¯ R2 expF
Linear Trend
ex post -1.43 1.47 0.23 -0.18 0.44 6.76
(3.73) (5.80) (1.36) (4.98) [0.17]
ﬁxed sample -1.36 1.31 0.08 -0.16 0.37 6.28
(3.49) (5.26) (0.61) (3.75) [0.08]
rolling sample -1.03 1.50 0.52 -0.25 0.53 5.80
(3.81) (9.72) (5.55) (6.32) [0.43]
Quadratic Trend
ex post -1.47 1.44 -0.10 -0.20 0.44 6.78
(4.01) (5.38) (1.03) (5.18) [0.17]
ﬁxed sample -0.61 1.34 0.35 -0.22 0.47 6.46
(1.38) (6.55) (3.18) (5.48) [0.21]
rolling sample -1.36 1.29 -0.04 -0.19 0.43 7.78
(3.57) (4.59) 0.25 (4.78) [0.09]
Hodrick Prescott Filter
ex post -1.22 1.24 0.23 -0.20 0.44 5.86
(2.79) (4.79) (1.07) (5.13) [0.30]
ex ante -2.36 1.85 1.30 -0.17 0.48 6.51
(5.24) (7.76) (3.71) (5.16) [0.30]
Figures in round brackets are absolute t-statistics. Figures in squared
brackets are the p-values of the expF test.
22Figure 1: Growth of Real GDP Over Previous Year: Ex Post and Real-Time










Figure 2: Ex Post Estimates of the Output Gap














23Figure 3: Real-Time Estimates of the Output Gap
Linear trend








































24Figure 4: Real-Time Versus Ex Post Recursive Output Gap Estimates
Linear trend










Linear trend (moving window)





















Quadratic trend (moving window)























25Figure 5: Real-time SVR output gap measure versus time series-based measures
SVR fixed moving
Linear Trend












































26Figure 7: Recursive Coeﬃcient Estimates ±2 Standard Errors
backward: inflation
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